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May brought several significant developments for the KORUS FTA. On May 10, the Bush Administration and 
Congress announced an agreement on a new trade policy, focusing in particular on labor and environmental issues 
pertinent to FTAs. In mid-May, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) issued its formal ruling on the 
safety of U.S. beef, a significant sticking point in bilateral trade relations.  At the end of the month, the United 
States and Korea formally released the text of the agreement, while USTR published the assessments of the U.S.-
Korea FTA by the 27 trade advisory committees.  
 
Now that the text of the agreement has been released, along with the advisory committee assessments, the 
significant milestones that lie ahead include the formal signing of the agreement on June 30; the release of the 
ITC assessment of the economic impacts of the agreement; and the administration’s submission of implementing 
text to Congress, most likely in the fall. While these are some of the key events for the KORUS FTA, its long-
term prospects for passage and implementation will also be affected by issues relating to the new trade policy 
agreement and the OIE ruling. The following is a brief look at these issues and some of the key provisions in the 
FTA text and the advisors’ assessments: 
  
New Trade Policy Agreement: On May 10, Congressional leaders and the administration announced a new 
agreement on U.S. trade policy. The agreement calls for the United States to include enforceable labor and 
environmental standards in its FTAs. This will likely clear the way for the passage of the pending FTAs with Peru 
and Panama, but the pending FTAs with Korea and Colombia still face other substantive objections in Congress.  
 
The agreement, along with prior comments by some members of Congress, has led to a significant amount of 
speculation in the Korean press that the United States will seek to renegotiate parts of the KORUS FTA. Korean 
officials have been adamant that they will not renegotiate the deal they arduously reached with the United States 
only two months ago but have left the door open for additional negotiations. The Korea Times quoted Kim Jong-
hoon, South Korea’s chief negotiator, as saying that “The government’s basic position is that any renegotiation is 
unacceptable. But if the demands from the U.S. fit the interests of both sides, a thorough review will become 
necessary.” Korea is keeping the door of additional negotiation open due to the importance of incorporating these 
labor and environmental standards into the FTA for its passage on Capitol Hill. However, it is likely that Korea’s 
adamant stance against renegotiation is based on a desire to avoid renegotiating the FTA with Congress, which is 
what TPA was designed to avoid. Further, to do so would invite members of the National Assembly to seek 
revisions as well. Jung Tae-in, a former aide to President Roh for economic affairs, already suggested as much 
when he was quoted in the Korea Times as saying “If the renegotiation is inevitable, Korea should also actively 
demand something more.” The Chosun Ilbo also reports that a U.S. law firm has advised Korea to renegotiate the 
labor and environmental provisions to gain additional concessions in areas of importance to Korea. It quotes a 
governmental official as saying that Korea would seek a guaranteed number of visa quotas for professionals. 
 
It should be noted that Korea is already a party to all of the environmental treaties that the United States is 
seeking to include in the FTA and practices the International Labor Organization principles outlined in the 
agreement. 
 
Beef: The OIE officially voted in mid-May to place beef from the United States into the category of “controlled” 
risk. Under the OIE’s guidelines, countries with the controlled risk classification can export all of their beef 
without restriction, except for specific risk materials such as skulls, brains and vertebrae. Kwon Okyu, Korea’s 
Minister of Finance and Economy, was quoted by the Associated Press as saying that “Our government will 
sincerely hold negotiations on revising the terms of importing (U.S. beef) by respecting the recommendation of 
the World Organization for Animal Health.” He also said that Korea would conduct a review of U.S. safety 
procedures before revising the trade rules. If all goes well, it is expected that U.S. bone-in-beef could return to 
Korea by September. In the long term, this may no longer be an issue as the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy 
and Negotiations’ assessment notes that the two sides reached an agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures under which Korea will recognize the equivalence of the U.S. food safety inspection system for meat 
and poultry.   
 
FTA Text and Advisory Committee Assessments: The Advisory Committee for Trade Policy Negotiations 
(ACTPN) report fully endorses the agreement, stating that the KORUS FTA is in the best interests of the U.S. 
economy and achieves the negotiating objectives set out under TPA. It also concludes that the agreement will help 
to reduce the disadvantages the United States faces from the proliferation of intra-Asia FTAs. Several issues 
discussed in the different committee assessments are worth noting. 
 
Automobiles and Capital Goods. The combined committee on automobiles and capital goods produced a divided 
opinion on the agreement, while also attaching assessments by Ford and GM. Ford expressed concerns about the 
failure to include the light truck tariff in the “snapback” provision of the dispute mechanism, as well as the overall 
threshold that a U.S. producer must meet to compel the United States to utilize the mechanism. Under this 
provision, if one of the parties were found to be in violation of its automotive commitments in the FTA, the 
aggrieved party would be able to reimpose its tariff at the most favored nation level. In addition, Ford was not 
satisfied with the gains made on non-tariff barriers such as Korea’s engine displacement taxes and environmental 
standards for automobiles, but it did acknowledge that there was some progress in these areas. The Ford 
assessment also pointed out that U.S. hybrid vehicles are not included in the immediate tariff phase-out for cars. 
GM was more positive in its assessment of the agreement, stating that it addresses many of the auto industry’s 
concerns and describing the dispute settlement’s “snapback” provision as “an innovate approach that has the 
potential to discourage the creation of new non-tariff barriers or the reinstatement of old ones.” One further note 
on the dispute settlement body for automobiles is that, if neither side has been found to be in violation of their 
commitments after ten years, the panel will be terminated. Finally, Ford and Chrysler have released statements 
expressing their inability to support the KORUS FTA, while GM has taken a neutral position.   
 
Agriculture. The ANTCP assessment concluded that nearly $2 billion in current farm exports to Korea will 
become duty free upon the agreement’s coming into force. Currently, Korea offers duty free access to only $14 
million worth of U.S. agricultural products. Further details on the previously announced “in” season and “out of” 
season tariff on oranges indicate that over time the “in’ season tariff will be eliminated as the duty free tariff rate 
quota, starting at 2,500 metric tons, will increase 3% annually in perpetuity. The Agricultural Technical Advisory 
committees (ATAC) were for the most part positive about the agreement (though the Animal and Animal 
Products Committee’s report was not available). However, the ATAC on processed foods issued no opinion due 
to its strong concerns over rice being excluded and concerns that the tariff benefits achieved in the agreement 
could be nullified by issues not addressed in the chapter on technical barriers to trade. 
 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The industry committee covering TBT provided only conditional support for 
the agreement. While it stressed that the chapter provided for considerable improvements, the industry committee 
expressed concern over how the chapter will be implemented. Some items the committee would like clarified by 
USTR and the Korean government include: an understanding that the TBT Committee established by the FTA 
will assist in resolving TBT disputes; assurance that the Committee will meet in a timely manner; allowance for 
the formation of a special working group to address specific issues such as transparency and national treatment; 
and clarity that the Committee’s mandate is to resolve TBT disputes. 
 
Safeguards. Under the trade remedies provisions of the FTA, either party may implement a safeguard measure if 
a substantial increase in the importation of a good leads to serious injury of the domestic industry. Under these 
provisions, a safeguard can be applied during the transition period of the FTA, the first ten years, to a good for the 
adjusting industry for up to two years, or three years if the competent importing authority determines that the 
extension is needed to prevent serious injury and foster adjustment and if the industry is adjusting. For any good 
with a longer tariff phaseout period, the transition period is the tariff elimination period for that good. A safeguard 
measure may not be applied to a good more than once. 
 
North Korea: The text of the agreement defines a Korean for the purposes of the FTA in terms of the meaning of 
the Nationality Act in Korea.  However, the agreement also contains a footnote stating the following: “A natural 
person who is domiciled in the area north of the Military Demarcation Line on the Korean peninsula shall not be 
entitled to benefits under this agreement.   
  
The text of the agreement provides for establishment of a committee on “outward processing zones” on the Korean 
peninsula. This committee will assess the potential future inclusion of any such zones in the agreement based on 
“progress towards denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; the impact of the outward processing zones on intra-
Korean relations; and the environmental standards, labor standards and practices, wage practices, and business and 
management practices prevailing in the outward processing zone, with due references to the situation prevailing 
elsewhere in the local economy and the relevant international norms” —and potentially other criteria. However, any 
recommendations reached by the committee would have to be approved by both countries’ respective legislatures 
before they could take effect. 
